Industrial Policy

There is a deplorable tendency for industrial policy and assistnce to favour the status quo rather than to encourage the new and original.  The result is that governemt industrail plolicy has a built in tendency to respond to the powerful lobbiers and interests in place rather than assist the as yet weak and struggling newcomers and original innovators who are inevitably unpopular and/or constitute a threat to those already dominating the markets with their (perhaps dated or inappropriate) products and viewis.

The irony is that those who might best benifit a dynamic and developing society probably have little time to induldge in complicated, bureaucratic, proceedures, lobbying, and form filling to obtain the few crumbs remaining after the table has been  pillaged by long established business, labour, regional, and sectorial lobbies.

Consequently, an intelligent government abstains from enthusiatically implementing industrial policies as they inevitably reflect the present distribution of economic and political power steming from the application of yesterday's and today's technologies and industrail practices rather than those that disrupt the present interests and tha the future needs to adopt.  Government industrial policies, freed from the reality of market forces, tend to react to the views of established ieconomic, political, and ndustrial actors. In so doing they continue to perpetuate the misapplicatin of economic resources to outmoded but powierful lobbies and influential producers of products and services.  The innovator and the creator of new products and services generally has little influence and say in their elaboration and implementation.  And, too often governments favor large burecratic suppliers in their procurement and payment practices.

Governments , at best can try to remove obstacles and unnecessary hurdles to innovation and the introduction of new prducts and services. Government industrial policies must permit declining industriest to decline gracefully rather than desperately attempt to surpport their continued activity.  A declining industry can usefully permit resources to be liberated and applied to more efficient and productive economic activity, perhaps in another region. Unfortunately, all too often govenment induatrial policies respond to political pressures rather than the underlying economic facts that have ultiately to be faced if progress is to be made.  Fighting the inevitable is too often the halmark of government industrial actions, it is seldom that of enlightened leader and innovator.

Obscene US Double Taxation

Much taxation is a disquised form of theft. US double taxation of its 'citizens is a particularly obscene example.


Link:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704002104575290451594973266.html#articleTabs%3Darticle

USA Surporting Israeli Investigation fo Gaza flotilla Incident

In view of the volume of misinformation disseminated by Israel's spokesmen and women, an investigation by Israel, by definition, will lack the objectivity and credibility required to placate those offended by Israel's failure to abide by the norms of civilized or rational behavior.  Therefore, any attempt by the USA to suggest or imply that such an investigation could be fruitful risks appearing at best stupidly naive, at worst two-faced.

Read more: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1994131,00.html?xid=newsletter-daily#ixzz0puSVnstM


http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1994131,00.html?xid=newsletter-daily

Euro Viability and the Quality of Decision-Making

Many of the present difficulties experienced by the euro are the direct result of the European Central Bank's reprehensible attempt to assume responsibility for proping up junk Greek and PIIGS bonds. Until clear-cut, debt restructuring is undertaken, allowing foolish lenders seeking high interest returns, and profligate spenders to suffer the consequences of their own irresponsibility, we can expect the crisis to continue to spiral out of contrlol. Eurozone financial 'leaders ' have raised the stakes unncecessarily high,, in effect betting the viability and solvency of European financial institutions on the behavior and perfomance of economies and governments with a poor track record. All tihs in the absence of adquate contrls, regualtion and penalties for thsoe who transgress the rules.

Unfortunately, European 'leaders' have led by example, and their track record since the founding of the Eurozpne has been deplorable, including the behavior of Germany and France. Is there any wonder that financial markets and lenders have little confidence that Euopean policicians mean what they so piously say. Would you trust a persistent liar, or someone who makes pious promises in writing only to break them the moment such promises prove inconveient? Can you trust an ECB that has obviously acted to protect foolish over-extended bank lenders, including French and German banks that have made doubtful loans to Greece and the PIIGS, rather than protect the long-term stability and value of the euro and the long-term integrety of the Eurozone 's political and financila institutions?

The problem is not the performance of European economies, the problem is the performance of Euroean decision-makers, (even when they don't obfusticate, and avoid decisions). Expect the Euro to survive, despite European 'leaders ... and expect the relative value of the US dollar to ultimately reflect the poorer fundamentals of the US economy the moment the Eurozone appears to be getting its act together.


Link:
http://online.wsj.com/community/groups/market-view-845/topics/do-you-expect-euro-further?mod=djemcomnewtopicingroup&mg=com-wsj

Euro Viability and the Quality of Decision-Making

Many of the present difficulties experienced by the euro are the direct result of the European Central Bank's irressponsible attempt to assume responsibility for proping up junk Greed gonds and PIIGS bonds. Until clear-cut, debt restructuring is undertaken, allowing foolish lenders seeking high interest returns, and profligate spenders to suffer the consequences of their own irresponsibility, we can expect the crisis to continue to spiral out of contrlol. Eurozone financial 'leaders ' have raised the stakes unncecessarily high,, in effect betting the viability and solvency of European financial institutions on the behavior and perfomance of economies and governments with a poor track record. All tihs in the absence of adquate contrls, regualtion and penalties for thsoe who transgress the rules.

Unfortunately, European 'leaders' have led by example, and their track record since the founding of the Eurozpne has been deplorable, including the behavior of Germany and France. Is there any wonder that financial markets and lenders have little confidence that Euopean policicians mean what they so piously say. Would you trust a persistent liar, or someone who makes pious promises in writing only to break them the moment such promises prove inconveient? Can you trust an ECB that has obviously acted to protect foolish over-extended bank lenders, including French and German banks that have made doubtful loans to Greece and the PIIGS, rather than protect the long-term stability and value of the euro and the long-term integrety of the Eurozone 's political and financila institutions?

The problem is not the performance of European economies, the problem is the performance of Euroean decision-makers, (even when they don't obfusticate, and avoid decisions). Expect the Euro to survive, despite European 'leaders ... and expect the relative value of the US dollar to ultimately reflect the poorer fundamentals of the US economy the moment the Eurozone appears to be getting its act together.


Link:
http://online.wsj.com/community/groups/market-view-845/topics/do-you-expect-euro-further?mod=djemcomnewtopicingroup&mg=com-wsj

Greek Crisis and the Eurozone

There is the need to distinguish between restructuring Greek debt and the viability of the Eurozone. Unfortunately the financial markets and European political 'leaders' have continued to obfusticate and confuse this distiction.

Let there be no ambiguity: Properly organised the Euroone can permit Greece to go basnkrupt or restructure its loans without placing at risk the Eurozone or European poitical and financial institutions.  There would be inconvenience and some foolish lenders who sought high risk premiums on their investments in Greek bonds would have to take a hair cut.  But the bankruptcy of a small government that, like any Ponzi scheme fraudster lied, deliberately used debts to spend more than its means, and represents only three percent of the Eurozone GNP hardly represents an overwhelming disaster.  Indeed a Greek default would most probably in the long run strengthen the Euro and its Institutions, and teach foolish bankers and lenders, profligate Greeks and PIIGS, and irresponsible politicial 'leaders' lessons they need to learn.

The greatest mistake would be to risk all by extending open-ended support to those who manifestly are unable, or unwilling, to abide by rules and keep their spending inder control.

Link:
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/05/are-the-barbarians-at-the-eu's-gates-/68044.aspx

Trichet Disembles, ECB Errors of Judgement Provoke Euro Crisis

Either Mr Jean-Claude Trichet is more stupid than I am prepared to admit or he is deliberately avoiding discussion of the most important consequence of the ECB and its Governing Council decision to buy junk bonds issued by profligate and irresponsible Eurozone governments.

Mr Trichet continually attempts to distract the uninformed observer by insisting that the ECB has taken steps to neutralise the increased liquidity and inflationalry pressures created by such short-sighted purchases. Evidently, such a maneuver is technically interesting but it hardly addresses a significant or urgent problem. The current level of ECB's purchases of Greek junk bonds is not going to provoke immediate or significant inflation in the Eurozone.

The significant and most important effect of the ECB decison to purchase junk bonds issued by the PIIGS must, however, be addressed. Symbolically and in fact, the ECB's actions and new policy gave official encouragement and support to profligate and irresponsible deficit expenditures by the PIIGS. Expeditures over which the ECB had no effective means of control. Not only that, the ECB decision converted the Greek deficit problem, into a Eurozone crisis, by deliberately and unnecessarily placing the credibility of Eurozone institutions at risk. The ECB action also raised the suspicion of a gratuitous bail out for foolish German and French banks that lent rather too generously to the Greek government.

Little wonder that the financial markets reacted badly and magnified the Greek difficulties, and a possible restructuring of Greek debt, into a crisis threatening the stability of the whole Eurozone. Reasonably, markets started to seriously question the judgement, the rationality, and decision-making abilities of European 'leaders', and inevitably lost confidence in the euro and European financial institutions.

Ironically, the underlying economic realities should be supporting an appreciation of the euro in comparision with the dollar. The ECB and Euopean leaders are playing with fire when they lurch from indecision to panic regulation and largess. The secondary and unforeseen consequences of ECB and Council actions require steadier hands, more patience, and greater wisdom.

Most of all, Europe requires appropriate institutions, procedures, and effective penalties for financial irresponsibility. Their absence is the direct result of the deliberate decisions made by those who too often protected their own narrow interests despite styling themselves 'European leaders'.

Links:

http://www.economist.com/business-finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=16167998

http://www.economist.com/node/16167998/comments#comment-552806

ME Comments published by the Economist

I have yet to be convinced that the Conservative Party and it's leaders have any real understanding of Europpean issues, and this disqualifies them. Their euro-fobia makes it doubtful the Conservative Party could forrm a credible government capable of responsibly managing our relations with our European neighbours and European Istitutions.

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David Cameron's splendid isolation

Apr 4th 2010 12:03 GMT

When the Euro-sceptic Conservative Party rejected Ken Clarke as leader, it demonstrated it had lost contact with the real world. It's continued failure to understand European issues and the need for Britain to involve itself in the development of European political, economic and social environments demonstrate its continuing need to acquire some political maturity.

A party leader that only grudgingly admits the necessity of recognising the existence of, and necesity for close, intimate participation in the building of the most powerful institutions that will shape our future European environment and protect or damage our interests, can expect a responsible citizen to vote for another party.

Mr Cameron and his collegues must demonstrate they are able to handle relations with the world, including Europe, as it is in the 21st century, not as it might have been in the 19th century.

Mr Cameron must acknowledge that the attitude of his party to Europe is even more important than any other issue he must be prepared to meet should he ever be invited to form a government.

I have yet to be convinced that the Conservative Party and it's leaders have any real understanding of Europpean issues, and this thua un ny eyes disqualifies them. Their euro-fobia makes it doubtful the Conservative Party could forrm a credible government capable of responsibly managing our relations with our European neighbours and European Istitutions.

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169_OPN

Mar 31st 2010 2:27 GMT

Dear Sir,
New Labour failed to address long term economic issues and indulged in throwing money at percieved problems rather than making difficult or unpopular but necessary decisoins. A Chancellor Brown short changed infrastucture investment until disasters arose, in sectors such as education, transport, and health. Money alone can typically never solve economic and social problems, and may on occassion have the perverse effect of increasing difficulties. In unifersity education, New labour betrayed the ideal of free and open access to advanced education by the poorest members of the population, and thereby reduced opportunities for the talented and hard working students to make a full and productive use of their talents.
New Labour has been a profound disappointment. Ideals betrayed, objectives neglected, money and resource squandered, necessary reforms avoided.
All this capped by Browns failure to recognise the importance of the 'euro' for Brittain's future and his failure to implement even his own guidelines of husbanding resources in good times for use in bad. He also undoubtedly contributed to the negect of adequate supervision of financial institutions, choosing once again the easy options of neglect rather than the rigours of execising and implementing constructive criticism and necessary structural reforms.
In short, New Labour has failed time and again to address underlying causes and real problems, and resorted to carressing the visible surface of institutions rather than addressed fundamental issues.
Obsessive kowtowing to the worst aspects of the Bush administration's security and war policies became a symbol of Blain and Brown's inability to deal with other than surface issues, Almost, anything requiring in depth analysis and thought, or leadership rather than public relation masaging, has been neglected. This is typified by the constant introduction of new terorism and criminal laws, with little thought for civil liberties.
New Labour has been by parts, catastrophic and a dismal failure, and is matched or exceeded only by the incompetance of the rump Conservative opposition that existed survived the Blair/Brown defeat of Major's divided party.

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Oceans of red ink

Feb 3rd 2010 11:31 GMT

So Britain and the United States proportionally have a deficit larger than Greece. Makes you think, particularly if you also note the deprecation in the value of the dollar and sterling in terms of the euro. Indeed, in comparison Greece's performance almost looks as if it deserves praise !!

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Greek Restructuring or Banckruptcy

Damaging as it might have been Greece should have been allowed to go bankrupt within the Eurozone.  The recent naive actions of the ECB and Euroepean 'leaders' have indicated panic and short-term thinking, rather than thoughtful, measured actions contributing to long-term stability.  The survival of Eurozone policitical and monetary Instituions are now threatrened by the implied open-ended committment to support and finance PIIGS's debts and junk government bonds.  The bankruptcy of the Greek government and subsequent restructuiring of Greek debts would only have directly affected some three percent of the Euro economy, True the contagion effects would have been considerable, but they could not in themselves threaten the financial viability of the ECB and Eurozone governments. European 'leaders' and the ECB have irresponsibly succeded in turning a Greek crisis into a Euro crisis by staking their credibility on the behaviousr of those they are providing incentives to behave badly... Few believe that Greece can avoid the need to  restructure its debts.  This implies continuing need for generous donors willing to overlook profligate incompetence. All this is an unacceptable incentive for others to follow Greece's appalling example.

Unfortunately, the motives of some politicaians seeking to bail out Greek deficits are also suspect as their national banks are deeply involved in high-risk loans to the Greek government (for which they recieved high-interest rates) that are now threatened with a haircut. At least the Dutch and German Central Banks had the wit to oppose the ECB's purchase of junk governemnt bonds. One thing that must be learnt from the present euro-crisis is that politicians should be kept at arm length from euro-monetary decisions. A second lesson to be learnt is that politicians cannot change economic realities by actions that do not address the fundamental problems.  As for German attempts to restrict hedge fund activities, it is simply like trying to cut a hole in water with a short dagger. Once again we are witnessing valiant attempts by politicians to control the symptoms rather than tackle uncomfortable causes of the present difficulties.

Dollar or Euro Devaluation?

Only those continuing to live in a land of illusion cab believe that the US dollar is in better condition than the euro. Indeed all the financial and budgetary indicators suggest it is the United Sates and the dollar that is destined to decline in relative value the moment the markets wake up to the real facts. The only question is how long the markets can continue to fool themselves. Possibly too long ... until a crisis of confidence inevitably brings the house down ... as those participationg in finacial markets too often favour, indeed cling to, their self-serving illusions.


Link:
:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703745904575247902544445326.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hps_MIDDLETopStories#articleTabs%3Dcomments

Opportunity or High Risk Undertaking?

The Europeans have adopted an appalingly dangerous strategy by making what are in effect open-ended commitments to support profligate members, no matter hat their financial or monetary 'sins'. The stakes are extremely high, and they unwiisely have left no room for manoever.

What is now indispensible is the timely creation of the requisite financial and fiscal infrastructure to support the huge Eurozone commitments that have been made under the pressure of market and lender panic.

There is therefore scope for laying soilid foundations for Europe and at the same time ample opportunity to once again fail to create the proceedures, policies, and regulations backed by effective sanctions and penalties for those who insist on behaving irresponsibly. The need to control or restrain even the largest offenders makes makes the tadk challenging and difficult given the evasion and obfustication to which many European national 'leaders' are adicted.

At present, it is not clear that European 'leaders' are aware of the full implications of the decisions made involve. the Eurozzone needs a little luck. to make the great risks taken pay off.


Link:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB40001424052748704250104575238250564951356.html?mod=djemITPE_h#articleTabs%3Dcomments

The Greek Example and the Dangfers for Europe

I have just spent a week arguing against Greek economists who appear to believe Greece and Greeks have a God given right to spend more than they earn.

There is a real risk that other states are in a similar position and likely to fall victim to a collapse of confidence in their ability to repay debts and pay for new borrowing requirements . Unless convincing rates of growth can be established lenders are going to take fright in present turbulent markets.

Unfortunately for Europe, the recent European Central Bank decision to accept Greek junk bonds as collateral implies a policy that would place Eurozone Institutions at risk. Perhaps it would have been wiser to let Greece remain in the Eurozone but permit it, (a small government) to go bankrupt. the resulting disturbance and pain would have been inconvenient but would have been a salutary lesson for others following the Greek example. Greece would, of course have learnt, the hard way, the consequences of profligate expenditures based on what has essentially been a government run Ponzi sheme.

Any assistance for Greece, must now take into account the implications for the whole Eurozone, and its institutions. Europeans now have to impose controls on monetary and fiscal strategies and establish effectiive penalties for a Eurozone Member State's failure to act responsibly. Anything less courts disaster.


Link:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703338004575230012501499240.html?mod=djemEditorialPage_h#articleTabs%3Dcomments

The Need for Confidence and Practical Policies

A floating exchange rate regime wouldn't allow  Greece the kind of eononomic autarchy that Britain enjoyed in the nineteenth century, the United States in the twentieth century, and possibly China currently.  There will, therefore, always remain the need to convince foreign lenders if persistent import-export deficits cannot be eliminated, i.e. constant constraint on economic policies.

Practical policies inevitably involve the inconveniences and 'imperfections' experienced in an environment subject to egregious human behaviour, including political, social, and frictional effects.  In the appropriate situation, short-term deficit financing, can have its place; but in practice Keynesian theory has limitations both in the longer run, and most particularly for economies that cannot avoid the implications  of financing persistent export-import deficits.  The PIIGS,

France, and the UK illustrate another constraint, the need to retain the confidence of creditors, both domestic and international. It is evident that the level and persistence of their deficits are begining to emphasise importance of the long term viability their fical and monetary policies.

Serious economic advice and policy must take into account the world as it is, not the world as we might like it to be.

Greece, Re-establisning Lender Confidence

Any fool can enjoy prosperity if someone else is paying for it.  Surely it is not a punishment to require someone to live within their means.  Necessarily, that involves reducing expenditures.  There is no magic source of 'mana from heaven'.  The world does not owe Greeks a prosperous living just because they lived well on borrowed funds.  Unfortunately, when you borrow the implication is you pay interest and remburse the loan in accordance with the terms agreed.  Otherwise, lenders simply lose confidence and ultimately won't lend.  And why should they?

You are right to draw attention to the unpleasant consequences of having to tighten the proverbial belt and find the means to repay interest and loans.  But the only alternative to Greece having the freedom to make that kind of mistake is to enforce strict regulation of government deficit and debt levels. Unfortunately for Greeks the negative consequences they may suffer are less important than the credibility that is gained by Eurozone Institutions if they take the measures required to retain investor credibility.  Indeed, a European crash would inflict more damage on Greece than any reduction in profligate Greek expenditures or Greek bankruptcy conducted within the Euroone.

An essential diference between the Greek crisis and historical examples cited is that the Greek economy is only one small part of the the European economy at risk.  At least Greece is advantaged by a continuing ability to trade in a relatively stable currency and thus protected froom the full consequences of its choices.

The chaos and devaluations, the austerity programs, the constraints and restrictions imposed on foreign trading, on holiday expenditures, on capital transfers and foreign purchases, etc.,  experienced in the years before the Eurozone should be recalled before anyone advocates throwing it over in favor of a resuscitation of a multipicity of national currencies in Europe.  

Interest rates paid by Greek borrowers are likely to remain high untill lender confidence is restored.  Instability and uncertainty raises costs, and certainly some economic activities in Greece will suffer from reductions and redirection of expenditures. But that is to be expected and is required if constructive changes are to be realized. Self-evidently, when necessary confiidence can be won by achieving growth or demonstrating economic flexibility, rather than simply by maintaining austerity cuts, such policies should be vigorously pursued.  The two policies are intimately interrelated, but winning investor confidence is vital. Austerity is not an end in itself, it is not necessary when demand is satisfied by increased productivity and lenders have enough confidence to extend indispensible credit.  The difficulty is that once credibility is lost, tha the need for lender confidence is immediate and it inevitably takes time before the fruits of economic reform can enhance productivity.

Link:

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/sinn31/English#comments

Allocating Blame for the Greek Crisis

Greek pensioners and wage eraners have benifited form the policies implemented by the government they choose. To that extent they are responsibile for the present situation in Greece.  Evidently the politicians they supported are also responsible for the Greek situation, they did not exercise prudent leadership.  That is the past, now the consequences are more evident. Even pensioners and wage earners cannot reasonably expect to be paid more than the economy can afford in terms of real resources (goods and services). This is not a 'blame game'. No one is trying to punish Greek pensioners and wage-earners, (Usually, it is the creators and managers of Ponzi schemes that are prosecuted and jailed).  The issue is simply one of matching expenditures to the resources available.  An economy cannot consume more than it produces, no matter what economic system is used.

Inflation is not at present on the cards for Greece because it is in the Eurozone.  Continuing profligate expenditure patterns under a flesible Greek currency regime would inevitably involve inflationary problems. Lack of productivity and flexibility in the Greek private sector can in the long run can be addressed by Greece, and with the help of Europe provided such assistance is directed to productivity increasing investments and not squandered or diverted to consumer spending and social benifits.  There is a need for Greeks and Greek authorities to face up to the constraints imposed by the need to retain the confidence of internal and international lenders.

Renewed and sustained growth is required. Investor confidence could then be regained, and outside help expected provided realistic reforms are being implemented.

Japanese domestic savings, considerably higher than Greek or European levels, permitted very high japanese deficit financing. But this alone has not saved Japan from its long lasting recession.  Japan has  failed despite the advantages and disadvantages of enjoying their own fiat currency and flexible exchange rate regime.  Eurozone considerations are not the real cause of Greek difficulties.   Such difficulties stem, more fundamentally, from a lsck of investor confidence in Greek prospects comensurate with the level of debt incurred by Greece.

At the European level the present mess is undoubtedly the fault of our so-called 'political leaders' who operating, largely behind the closed doors, in the European Council, have inflicted on Europe a monetary system with inadequate institutional, procedures and regualtive structures, including a failure to establish effective peanalties for non-compliance.

From the first days of the ECB and Euro, our European 'leaders' chose to avoid the constraints on personal/political autonomy that a viable Eurozone required.  European electorates and opinion leaders are also responsible to the extent they have encouraged and permitted their national representatives to get away with evasion, obfustication, small-minded nationalistic attitudes, and shoddy compromises.

If we really wanted to reform the economic structures of the EU, we could do well to examine such politically taboo subjects as agricultural subsidies.  But perhaps that is a subject we should adress another day.

Greek Bailout a Serious Mistake?

 The bailout of Greece may well be a serious mistake.  This laxist decision has been compounded by the European Central Bank accepting Greek junk bonds as collateral for huge loans.  Better by far to have suffered the pain and inconvenience provoked by Greek bankruptcy, rather than risking the Eurozone Institutions by betting the PIIGS, not to mention France, will not make similar calls to prop up their profligate spending and irresponsible borrowing.

The point is that Greek bankruptcy and restructuring of its debts need not imply Greece leaving the Eurozone or the EU. Just as the bankruptcy of a relatively unimpoprtant State in the United States does not require the bankrupt State to leave the Union, or force it to cease using the US dollar. Further it should be noted that such a bankruptcy would not damage the dollar or the authority of Federal Institutions.

Foolishly, the importance and significance of the Greek crisis has been an importance that permits it to contaminate the future viability of European Institions.  Institutions that have no effective control over PIIG expenditures, because the European leaders so decided.

Fortunately, for the Eurozone the risks of UK insolvency do not directly threaten the viability of the Eurozone Institutions.

ECB Purchase of Government Bonds?

Exercised with careful discretion the purchase of government bonds could be a useful practice that might well stabilise markets. Unfortunately, if used immoderately such purchases of weakly performing bonds could ultimately destroy ECB credibility. Such purchases could be considered desperately similar to the ECB's acceptance of Greek junk bonds as security for huge loasns, and as such unecessarily placing the Eurozone and its Institutions at risk.

The Poor Quality of Eurozone Decisions

There are too many European countries that have been steadily working their way towards suffering the same experience as Greece. Unfortunately, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom have to be included as over-indulgeing in profligate expenditures financed by ever increasing debts.

The UK illustrates that such foolish behaviour is not limited to members of the Euroone.  Rather, the diffculties arise because politicians are or become addicted to paying out more than they recieve in revenues. Electorates, lulled by the bribes of their politicians, too often applaud such profligate spending based on debtr funding, forgeting such debts will inevitably need to be repaid.

In effect too many European countries have been tempted to run what are in effect Ponzi schemes, paying for past debts out of new incresed borrowing.  Naturally when lenders eventually loose confidence in the possibiity of repayment such Ponzi schemes collapse.

Irronically, the real difficulties experienced by the Eurozone are less the result of decisions made by unelected, highly oaid, privildeged eurocrats than the result of decisions made by pusillanimous, blinkered, prejudiced, provincial minded, politrical 'leaders' operating the Europen Council. These 'leaders' are national politicians, and national representatives.  Eurocrats are compelled to accept their decisons as final, even when their compromises and obfustications make little or no sense, obviously avoid the issues, and fail to make the choices and decisions required.

In the case of the Eurozone the evident lack has always been the institutional mechanisms to enforce and penalize unacceptable financial practices.  National 'leraders' have almost always avoided submitting to the disciplines required to make the Eurozone work effectively.  Restrictions  on the level of deficit budgeting have been unenforceable, and lack effective penalties for transgressions, because national 'leaders' wanted it that way, not because eurocrates offered poor advice or made bad decisions.

The greatest hoax perpetrated by our elected national 'leaders' has been their pretending they are not responsible for the decisions they have inflicted on their elctoratesand Eurocrats alike.  Dare one suggest that much as one legitimately dislikes the idea of unelected officials making decisions, the quality of choices made our elected national 'leaders' has been appalling.  Don't let our national politicians excape responsibility for their poor decisions by letting them blame eurocrats who are only permitted to impliment the orders of their political masters.

In truth electorates need to exercise greater control over the quality of decisions made by national politicians at home and when making European Coouncil decisions.  Too often they say one thing and do another.  It would help matters if 'our national leaders' were not allowed to make decisions affecing us behind closed doors.  At home, too often they buy votes with incressed debt. Too often they make poor European decisions to conserve personal power and autonomy, playing to the nationalistic prejudices of their electorates rather than explaing why, sometimes, it is in all our interests to cooperate.